Applying Abstract Argumentation Theory to Cooperative Game Theory
We apply ideas from abstract argumentation theory to study cooperative game theory. Building on Dung's results in his seminal paper, we further the correspondence between Dung's four argumentation semantics and solution concepts in cooperative game theory by showing that complete extensions (the grounded extension) correspond to Roth's subsolutions (respectively, the supercore). We then investigate the relationship between well-founded argumentation frameworks and convex games, where in each case the semantics (respectively, solution concepts) coincide; we prove that three-player convex games do not in general have well-founded argumentation frameworks.
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