A General Theory of Proportionality with Additive Utilities
We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints, participatory budgeting (including constraints specifying how funds must be allocated to projects from different pools), and public decision-making. Axioms of proportionality have recently been defined for this general model, but the proposed rules apply only to approval ballots, where each voter submits a subset of candidates she finds acceptable. We propose proportional rules for cardinal ballots, where each voter assigns a numerical value to each candidate corresponding to her utility if that candidate is selected. In developing these rules, we also introduce methods that produce proportional rankings, ensuring that every prefix of the ranking satisfies proportionality.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preferences
We study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient, strategyproof, and fair. Most previous work assumes t…
FairnessAchieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and focus on the classic fairness notion of proportionality. The indivisibility of the goods is long known to pose highly non-trivial obstacles to achieving fai…
FairnessNeural Non-additive Utility Aggregation
Neural architectures for set regression problems aim at learning representations such that good predictions can be made based on the learned representations. This strategy, however, ignores the fact that meaningful inter…
regressionAn extended Knowledge Compilation Map for Conditional Preference Statements-based and Generalized Additive Utilities-based Languages
Conditional preference statements have been used to compactly represent preferences over combinatorial domains. They are at the core of CP-nets and their generalizations, and lexicographic preference trees. Several works…
The Leximin Approach for a Sequence of Collective Decisions
In many situations, several agents need to make a sequence of decisions. For example, a group of workers that needs to decide where their weekly meeting should take place. In such situations, a decision-making mechanism …
Decision MakingFairness