A Proxy Attack-Free Strategy for Practically Improving the Poisoning Efficiency in Backdoor Attacks
Poisoning efficiency is crucial in poisoning-based backdoor attacks, as attackers aim to minimize the number of poisoning samples while maximizing attack efficacy. Recent studies have sought to enhance poisoning efficiency by selecting effective samples. However, these studies typically rely on a proxy backdoor injection task to identify an efficient set of poisoning samples. This proxy attack-based approach can lead to performance degradation if the proxy attack settings differ from those of the actual victims, due to the shortcut nature of backdoor learning. Furthermore, proxy attack-based methods are extremely time-consuming, as they require numerous complete backdoor injection processes for sample selection. To address these concerns, we present a Proxy attack-Free Strategy (PFS) designed to identify efficient poisoning samples based on the similarity between clean samples and their corresponding poisoning samples, as well as the diversity of the poisoning set. The proposed PFS is motivated by the observation that selecting samples with high similarity between clean and corresponding poisoning samples results in significantly higher attack success rates compared to using samples with low similarity. Additionally, we provide theoretical foundations to explain the proposed PFS. We comprehensively evaluate the proposed strategy across various datasets, triggers, poisoning rates, architectures, and training hyperparameters. Our experimental results demonstrate that PFS enhances backdoor attack efficiency while also offering a remarkable speed advantage over previous proxy attack-based selection methodologies.
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