An exact and two heuristic strategies for truthful bidding in combinatorial transport auctions
To support a freight carrier in a combinatorial transport auction, we proposes an exact and two heuristic strategies for bidding on subsets of requests. The exact bidding strategy is based on the concept of elementary request combinations. We show that it is sufficient and necessary for a carrier to bid on each elementary request combination in order to guarantee the same result as bidding on each element of the powerset of the set of tendered requests. Both heuristic bidding strategies identify promising request combinations. For this, pairwise synergies based on saving values as well as the capacitated p-median problem are used. The bidding strategies are evaluated by a computational study that simulates an auction. It is based on 174 benchmark instances and therefore easily extendable by other researchers. On average, the two heuristic strategies achieve 91 percent and 81 percent of the available sales potential while generating 36 and only 4 percent of the bundle bids of the exact strategy. Therefore, the proposed bidding strategies help a carrier to increase her chance to win and at the same time reduce the computational burden to participate in a combinatorial transport auction.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Strategic Bidding in 6G Spectrum Auctions with Large Language Models
Efficient and fair spectrum allocation is a central challenge in 6G networks, where massive connectivity and heterogeneous services continuously compete for limited radio resources. We investigate the use of Large Langua…
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format that has already been used in several recent European spectrum auctions. We characterize ex-post equilibria that feature auction-specific for…
Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctions
In non-truthful auctions such as first-price and all-pay auctions, the independent strategic behaviors of bidders, with the corresponding Bayes-Nash equilibrium notion, are notoriously difficult to characterize and can c…
Forbidden Facts: An Investigation of Competing Objectives in Llama-2
LLMs often face competing pressures (for example helpfulness vs. harmlessness). To understand how models resolve such conflicts, we study Llama-2-chat models on the forbidden fact task. Specifically, we instruct Llama-2 …
Adversarial AttackUniform price auctions with pre-announced revenue targets: Evidence from China's SEOs
This study explores the performance of auctions in China's seasoned equity offering (SEO) market, both theoretically and empirically. In these auctions, issuers must commit to a pre-announced revenue target and a maximum…