Anarchy in the swarm: Testing informed and uninformed diversity-enhancing mechanisms within PSO framework
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) frequently suffers from premature convergence. This paper introduces a family of problem-informed diversity-enhancing strategies that manipulate the swarm's social and cognitive components. These include opposing-best strategies that repel particles from optimal regions, negative learning strategies that guide exploration toward poor solutions, and reverse learning strategies that push particles away from inferior regions. These socio-cognitive mechanisms are evaluated against an analogous suite of problem-unaware, explicit randomization strategies that inject randomness either into velocity update components or directly into position updates. The results reveal that the effectiveness of diversity enhancement is determined primarily by how it is embedded within the swarm dynamics, rather than by the mere presence of extraneous problem-informed guidance. Particularly, random perturbations introduced at the velocity-update level consistently outperform those applied directly to particle positions.
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