paper-with-me

Papers

Approximation and Parameterized Complexity of Minimax Approval Voting

2016-07-26 · Marek Cygan, Łukasz Kowalik, Arkadiusz Socała, Krzysztof Sornat

We present three results on the complexity of Minimax Approval Voting. First, we study Minimax Approval Voting parameterized by the Hamming distance $d$ from the solution to the votes. We show Minimax Approval Voting admits no algorithm running in time $\mathcal{O}^\star(2^{o(d\log d)})$, unless the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) fails. This means that the $\mathcal{O}^\star(d^{2d})$ algorithm of Misra et al. [AAMAS 2015] is essentially optimal. Motivated by this, we then show a parameterized approximation scheme, running in time $\mathcal{O}^\star(\left({3}/{\epsilon}\right)^{2d})$, which is essentially tight assuming ETH. Finally, we get a new polynomial-time randomized approximation scheme for Minimax Approval Voting, which runs in time $n^{\mathcal{O}(1/\epsilon^2 \cdot \log(1/\epsilon))} \cdot \mathrm{poly}(m)$, almost matching the running time of the fastest known PTAS for Closest String due to Ma and Sun [SIAM J. Comp. 2009].

📄 PDF Abstract BibTeX arXiv:1607.07906

Code (0)

등록된 구현이 없습니다.

Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반

On Choosing Committees Based on Approval Votes in the Presence of Outliers

2015-11-13 · Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari

We study the computational complexity of committee selection problem for several approval-based voting rules in the presence of outliers. Our first result shows that outlier consideration makes committee selection proble…

Algorithms for Structured Elections under Thiele Voting Rules

2026-07-30 · Alexandra Lassota, Krzysztof Sornat arxiv

We study the computational complexity of winner determination problems in approval-based committee elections under Thiele voting rules. These form a class of rules parameterized by a fixed weight vector that specifies ho…

Multiwinner Temporal Voting with Aversion to Change

2024-08-20 · Valentin Zech, Niclas Boehmer, Edith Elkind, Nicholas Teh

We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are interested in identifying a winning committee for the s…

The method of Eneström and Phragmén for parliamentary elections by means of approval voting

2019-07-23 · Rosa Camps, Xavier Mora, Laia Saumell

We study a method for proportional representation that was proposed at the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century by Gustav Enestr\"om and Edvard Phragm\'en. Like Phragm\'en's better-known iterative minimax me…

Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting

2014-07-11 · Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Joachim Gudmundsson, Simon Mackenzie 외

We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voti…