Auditing Games for Sandbagging
Future AI systems could conceal their capabilities ('sandbagging') during evaluations, potentially misleading developers and auditors. We stress-tested sandbagging detection techniques using an auditing game. First, a red team fine-tuned five models, some of which conditionally underperformed, as a proxy for sandbagging. Second, a blue team used black-box, model-internals, or training-based approaches to identify sandbagging models. We found that the blue team could not reliably discriminate sandbaggers from benign models. Black-box approaches were defeated by effective imitation of a weaker model. Linear probes, a model-internals approach, showed more promise but their naive application was vulnerable to behaviours instilled by the red team. We also explored capability elicitation as a strategy for detecting sandbagging. Although Prompt-based elicitation was not reliable, training-based elicitation consistently elicited full performance from the sandbagging models, using only a single correct demonstration of the evaluation task. However the performance of benign models was sometimes also raised, so relying on elicitation as a detection strategy was prone to false-positives. In the short-term, we recommend developers remove potential sandbagging using on-distribution training for elicitation. In the longer-term, further research is needed to ensure the efficacy of training-based elicitation, and develop robust methods for sandbagging detection. We open source our model organisms at https://github.com/AI-Safety-Institute/sandbagging_auditing_games and select transcripts and results at https://huggingface.co/datasets/sandbagging-games/evaluation_logs . A demo illustrating the game can be played at https://sandbagging-demo.far.ai/ .
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