Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators
An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number of mediators, the sender's optimal value is characterized. For one mediator, the characterization has a geometric meaning of constrained concavification of sender's utility, optimal persuasion requires the same number of signals as without mediators, and the presence of the mediator is never profitable for the sender. Surprisingly, the second mediator may improve the value but optimal persuasion may require more signals.
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