Beyond Attack Success Rate: A Multi-Metric Evaluation of Adversarial Transferability in Medical Imaging Models
While deep learning systems are becoming increasingly prevalent in medical image analysis, their vulnerabilities to adversarial perturbations raise serious concerns for clinical deployment. These vulnerability evaluations largely rely on Attack Success Rate (ASR), a binary metric that indicates solely whether an attack is successful. However, the ASR metric does not account for other factors, such as perturbation strength, perceptual image quality, and cross-architecture attack transferability, and therefore, the interpretation is incomplete. This gap requires consideration, as complex, large-scale deep learning systems, including Vision Transformers (ViTs), are increasingly challenging the dominance of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). These architectures learn differently, and it is unclear whether a single metric, e.g., ASR, can effectively capture adversarial behavior. To address this, we perform a systematic empirical study on four medical image datasets: PathMNIST, DermaMNIST, RetinaMNIST, and CheXpert. We evaluate seven models (VGG-16, ResNet-50, DenseNet-121, Inception-v3, DeiT, Swin Transformer, and ViT-B/16) against seven attack methods at five perturbation budgets, measuring ASR, Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR), Structural Similarity Index Measure (SSIM), and $L_2$ perturbation magnitude. Our findings show a consistent pattern: perceptual and distortion metrics are strongly associated with one another and exhibit minimal correlation with ASR. This applies to both CNNs and ViTs. The results demonstrate that ASR alone is an inadequate indicator of adversarial robustness and transferability. Consequently, we argue that a thorough assessment of adversarial risk in medical AI necessitates multi-metric frameworks that encompass not only the attack efficacy but also its methodology and associated overheads.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Tasks
Adversarial RobustnessSimilar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Beyond Traditional Threats: A Persistent Backdoor Attack on Federated Learning
Backdoors on federated learning will be diluted by subsequent benign updates. This is reflected in the significant reduction of attack success rate as iterations increase, ultimately failing. We use a new metric to quant…
Backdoor AttackFederated LearningMUSE: A Run-Centric Platform for Multimodal Unified Safety Evaluation of Large Language Models
Safety evaluation of multimodal large language models requires tracking not only whether an attack succeeds, but also how the interaction unfolds across turns and input modalities. We present MUSE (Multimodal Unified Saf…
When Backdoors Go Beyond Triggers: Semantic Drift in Diffusion Models Under Encoder Attacks
Standard evaluations of backdoor attacks on text-to-image (T2I) models primarily measure trigger activation and visual fidelity. We challenge this paradigm, demonstrating that encoder-side poisoning induces persistent, t…
HoneyTrap: Deceiving Large Language Model Attackers to Honeypot Traps with Resilient Multi-Agent Defense
Jailbreak attacks pose significant threats to large language models (LLMs), enabling attackers to bypass safeguards. However, existing reactive defense approaches struggle to keep up with the rapidly evolving multi-turn …
Preventing Adversarial AI Attacks Against Autonomous Situational Awareness: A Maritime Case Study
Adversarial artificial intelligence (AI) attacks pose a significant threat to autonomous transportation, such as maritime vessels, that rely on AI components. Malicious actors can exploit these systems to deceive and man…