Bounded Rationality Equilibrium Learning in Mean Field Games
Mean field games (MFGs) tractably model behavior in large agent populations. The literature on learning MFG equilibria typically focuses on finding Nash equilibria (NE), which assume perfectly rational agents and are hence implausible in many realistic situations. To overcome these limitations, we incorporate bounded rationality into MFGs by leveraging the well-known concept of quantal response equilibria (QRE). Two novel types of MFG QRE enable the modeling of large agent populations where individuals only noisily estimate the true objective. We also introduce a second source of bounded rationality to MFGs by restricting agents' planning horizon. The resulting novel receding horizon (RH) MFGs are combined with QRE and existing approaches to model different aspects of bounded rationality in MFGs. We formally define MFG QRE and RH MFGs and compare them to existing equilibrium concepts such as entropy-regularized NE. Subsequently, we design generalized fixed point iteration and fictitious play algorithms to learn QRE and RH equilibria. After a theoretical analysis, we give different examples to evaluate the capabilities of our learning algorithms and outline practical differences between the equilibrium concepts.
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