Characterization of equilibrium existence and purification in general Bayesian games
This paper studies Bayesian games with general action spaces, correlated types and interdependent payoffs. We introduce the condition of ``decomposable coarser payoff-relevant information'', and show that this condition is both sufficient and necessary for the existence of pure-strategy equilibria and purification from behavioral strategies. As a consequence of our purification method, a new existence result on pure-strategy equilibria is also obtained for discontinuous Bayesian games. Illustrative applications of our results to oligopolistic competitions and all-pay auctions are provided.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
On the Approximate Purification of Mixed Strategies in Games with Infinite Action Sets
We consider a game in which the action set of each player is uncountable, and show that, from weak assumptions on the common prior, any mixed strategy has an approximately equivalent pure strategy. The assumption of this…
A Characterization of Reny's Weakly Sequentially Rational Equilibrium through $\varepsilon$-Perfect $γ$-Weakly Sequentially Rational Equilibrium
A weakening of sequential rationality of sequential equilibrium yields Reny's (1992) weakly sequentially rational equilibrium (WSRE) in extensive-form games. WSRE requires Kreps and Wilson's (1982) consistent assessment …
FormA Variational Inequality Approach to Bayesian Regression Games
Bayesian regression games are a special class of two-player general-sum Bayesian games in which the learner is partially informed about the adversary's objective through a Bayesian prior. This formulation captures the un…
regressionStochastic OptimizationEquilibrium Refinement in Finite Action Evidence Games
Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose t…
Cursed Sequential Equilibrium
This paper develops a framework to extend the strategic form analysis of cursed equilibrium (CE) developed by Eyster and Rabin (2005) to multi-stage games. The approach uses behavioral strategies rather than normal form …
Form