"Near" Weighted Utilitarian Characterizations of Pareto Optima
We characterize Pareto optimality via "near" weighted utilitarian welfare maximization. One characterization sequentially maximizes utilitarian welfare functions using a finite sequence of nonnegative and eventually positive welfare weights. The other maximizes a utilitarian welfare function with a certain class of positive hyperreal weights. The social welfare ordering represented by these "near" weighted utilitarian welfare criteria is characterized by the standard axioms for weighted utilitarianism under a suitable weakening of the continuity axiom.
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