Coalitional Games with Stochastic Characteristic Functions and Private Types
The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward among a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (deterministic or stochastic) characteristic function is known in advance. This paper studies a new setting (a task allocation problem) where the characteristic function is not known and it is controlled by some private information from the players. Hence, the challenge here is twofold: (i) incentivize players to reveal their private information truthfully, (ii) incentivize them to collaborate together. We show that existing reward distribution mechanisms or auctions cannot solve the challenge. Hence, we propose the very first mechanism for the problem from the perspective of both mechanism design and coalitional games.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Markovian Embeddings for Coalitional Bargaining Games
We examine the Markovian properties of coalition bargaining games, in particular, the case where past rejected proposals cannot be repeated. We propose a Markovian embedding with filtrations to render the sates Markovian…
Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks
In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise t…
Reserve Allocation in Active Distribution Systems for Tertiary Frequency Regulation: A Coalitional Game Theory-based Approach
This paper proposes a coalitional game theory-based approach for reserve optimization to enable DERs participate in tertiary frequency regulation. A two-stage approach is proposed to effectively and precisely allocate sp…
Online coalitional games for real-time payoff distribution with applications to energy markets
Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we desi…
A Partial Order for Strictly Positive Coalitional Games and a Link from Risk Aversion to Cooperation
We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stabili…