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Competing Bandits in Decentralized Large Contextual Matching Markets

2024-11-18 · Satush Parikh, Soumya Basu, Avishek Ghosh, Abishek Sankararaman

Sequential learning in a multi-agent resource constrained matching market has received significant interest in the past few years. We study decentralized learning in two-sided matching markets where the demand side (aka players or agents) competes for a `large' supply side (aka arms) with potentially time-varying preferences, to obtain a stable match. Despite a long line of work in the recent past, existing learning algorithms such as Explore-Then-Commit or Upper-Confidence-Bound remain inefficient for this problem. In particular, the per-agent regret achieved by these algorithms scales linearly with the number of arms, $K$. Motivated by the linear contextual bandit framework, we assume that for each agent an arm-mean can be represented by a linear function of a known feature vector and an unknown (agent-specific) parameter. Moreover, our setup captures the essence of a dynamic (non-stationary) matching market where the preferences over arms change over time. Our proposed algorithms achieve instance-dependent logarithmic regret, scaling independently of the number of arms, $K$.

📄 PDF Abstract BibTeX arXiv:2411.11794

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