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Competition, Persuasion, and Search

An agent engages in sequential search. He does not directly observe the quality of the goods he samples, but he can purchase signals designed by profit maximizing principal(s). We formulate the principal-agent relationship as a repeated contracting problem within a stopping game, and characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs. We show that when the agent's search cost falls below a given threshold, competition does not impact how much surplus is generated in equilibrium nor how the surplus is divided. In contrast, competition benefits the agent at the expense of total surplus when the search cost exceeds that threshold. Our results challenge the view that monopoly decreases market efficiency, and moreover, suggest that it leads to more information provision than does competition.

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