Conditional strategy equilibrium
In this note, we prove the existence of an equilibrium concept, dubbed conditional strategy equilibrium, for non-cooperative games in which a strategy of a player is a function from the other players' actions to her own actions. We study the properties of efficiency and coalition-proofness of the conditional strategy equilibrium in $n$-person games.
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