Condorcet-Consistent Choice Among Three Candidates
A voting rule is a Condorcet extension if it returns a candidate that beats every other candidate in pairwise majority comparisons whenever one exists. Condorcet extensions have faced criticism due to their susceptibility to variable-electorate paradoxes, especially the reinforcement paradox (Young and Levenglick, 1978) and the no-show paradox (Moulin, 1988). In this paper, we investigate the susceptibility of Condorcet extensions to these paradoxes for the case of exactly three candidates. For the reinforcement paradox, we establish that it must occur for every Condorcet extension when there are at least eight voters and demonstrate that certain refinements of maximin, a voting rule originally proposed by Condorcet (1785), are immune to this paradox when there are at most seven voters. For the no-show paradox, we prove that the only homogeneous Condorcet extensions immune to it are refinements of maximin. We also provide axiomatic characterizations of maximin and two of its refinements, Nanson's rule and leximin, highlighting their suitability for three-candidate elections.
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