Consciousness is not a physically provable property
We present a logical proof that computing machines, and by extension physical systems, can never be certain if they possess conscious awareness. This implies that human consciousness is associated with a violation of energy conservation. We examine the significance that a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, known as single mind Q (Barrett 1999), might have for the detection of such a violation. Finally we apply single mind Q to the problem of free will as it arises in some celebrated experiments by the neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Refuting Strong AI: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic
While physicalism requires only that a conscious state depends entirely on an underlying physical state, it is often assumed that consciousness is algorithmic and that conscious states can be copied, such as by copying o…
Testing the Machine Consciousness Hypothesis
The Machine Consciousness Hypothesis states that consciousness is a substrate-free functional property of computational systems capable of second-order perception. I propose a research program to investigate this idea in…
On a heuristic approach to the description of consciousness as a hypercomplex system state and the possibility of machine consciousness (German edition)
This article presents a heuristic view that shows that the inner states of consciousness experienced by every human being have a physical but imaginary hypercomplex basis. The hypercomplex description is necessary becaus…
ArticlesNon-separability of Physical Systems as a Foundation of Consciousness
A hypothesis is presented that non-separability of degrees of freedom is the fundamental property underlying consciousness in physical systems. The amount of consciousness in a system is determined by the extent of non-s…
Artificial Consciousness as Interface Representation
Whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems can possess consciousness is a contentious question because of the inherent challenges of defining and operationalizing subjective experience. This paper proposes a framework …