Consistency Deep Equilibrium Models
Deep Equilibrium Models (DEQs) have emerged as a powerful paradigm in deep learning, offering the ability to model infinite-depth networks with constant memory usage. However, DEQs incur significant inference latency due to the iterative nature of fixed-point solvers. In this work, we introduce the Consistency Deep Equilibrium Model (C-DEQ), a novel framework that leverages consistency distillation to accelerate DEQ inference. We cast the DEQ iterative inference process as evolution along a fixed ODE trajectory toward the equilibrium. Along this trajectory, we train C-DEQs to consistently map intermediate states directly to the fixed point, enabling few-step inference while preserving the performance of the teacher DEQ. At the same time, it facilitates multi-step evaluation to flexibly trade computation for performance gains. Extensive experiments across various domain tasks demonstrate that C-DEQs achieve consistent 2-20$\times$ accuracy improvements over implicit DEQs under the same few-step inference budget. Our code is available at https://github.com/landrarwolf/CDEQ.
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