Consumption Periods in Advance Selling Auctions: Evidence from US Timber Market
This study investigates products sold before consumption and examines how the duration of the consumption periods and the choice of selling mechanism influence sellers' revenue. Using empirical data from timber auctions, we identify buyers' tendency to delay consumption to resolve payoff uncertainty and reveal heterogeneous motivations among buyers. Through structural estimation, we uncover key parameters for each buyer type, including sensitivity to realized payoffs and consumption-related costs. Leveraging these estimates, we perform counterfactual analyses to propose revenue-enhancing consumption periods and selling mechanisms. Our findings suggest that extending the consumption periods is likely to increase revenue, with the magnitude depending on the selling mechanism, the composition of buyer types, and the number of interested buyers.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Tasks
counterfactualSensitivitySimilar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Recurring Auctions with Costly Entry: Theory and Evidence
Recurring auctions are ubiquitous for selling durable assets like artworks and homes, with follow-up auctions held for unsold items. We investigate such auctions theoretically and empirically. Theoretical analysis demons…
Loss-Versus-Fair: Efficiency of Dutch Auctions on Blockchains
Milionis et al.(2023) studied the rate at which automated market makers leak value to arbitrageurs when block times are discrete and follow a Poisson process, and where the risky asset price follows a geometric Brownian …
Dynamic Revenue Sharing
Many online platforms act as intermediaries between a seller and a set of buyers. Examples of such settings include online retailers (such as Ebay) selling items on behalf of sellers to buyers, or advertising exchanges (…
Neural Auctions Compromise Bidder Information
Single-shot auctions are commonly used as a means to sell goods, for example when selling ad space or allocating radio frequencies, however devising mechanisms for auctions with multiple bidders and multiple items can be…
Efficient allocations in double auction markets
This paper proposes a simple descriptive model of discrete-time double auction markets for divisible assets. As in the classical models of exchange economies, we consider a finite set of agents described by their initial…
Descriptive