Counterexamples to "Transitive Regret"
Theorem 1 in Bikhchandani & Segal (2011; Theoretical Economics) suggests that a complete, transitive, monotonic, and continuous preference is regret based if and only if it is expected utility. Their Proposition 1 suggests that transitivity and continuity of a regret-based preference implies an equivalence condition: if random variables $X$ and $Y$ have the same distribution, then $X\sim Y$. We give counterexamples to Proposition 1.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Regret theory, Allais' Paradox, and Savage's omelet
We study a sufficiently general regret criterion for choosing between two probabilistic lotteries. For independent lotteries, the criterion is consistent with stochastic dominance and can be made transitive by a unique c…
Regret Matching+: (In)Stability and Fast Convergence in Games
Regret Matching+ (RM+) and its variants are important algorithms for solving large-scale games. However, a theoretical understanding of their success in practice is still a mystery. Moreover, recent advances on fast conv…
Avoiding Undesired Choices Using Intelligent Adaptive Systems
We propose a number of heuristics that can be used for identifying when intransitive choice behaviour is likely to occur in choice situations. We also suggest two methods for avoiding undesired choice behaviour, namely t…
Ultimatum game: regret or fairness?
In the ultimatum game, the challenge is to explain why responders reject non-zero offers thereby defying classical rationality. Fairness and related notions have been the main explanations so far. We explain this rejecti…
FairnessIntent RecognitionProvably Efficient Regularized Online RLHF with Generalized Bilinear Preferences
We consider the problem of regularized best-response max-regret minimization in online RLHF under general preferences and bandit feedback. While various regularizers are utilized to robustify alignment, known polylogarit…