Data Provision to an Informed Seller
A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. The seller uses information to price discriminate the buyer. A designer offers a mechanism that provides the seller with additional information based on the seller's report about her type. We establish the impossibility of screening for welfare purposes, i.e., the designer can attain any implementable combination of buyer surplus and seller profit by providing the same signal to all seller types. We use this result to characterize the set of implementable welfare outcomes, study the seller's incentive to acquire third-party data, and demonstrate the trade-off between buyer surplus and efficiency.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationalit…
Reputation dependent pricing strategy: analysis based on a Chinese C2C marketplace
Most online markets establish reputation systems to assist building trust between sellers and buyers. Sellers' reputations not only provide guidelines for buyers but may also inform sellers their optimal pricing strategy…
InformativenessFrom Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based Pricing
An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has partial information about the product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. We characterize equilibrium…
Efficient Segmentation of Search Markets
I consider a two-sided frictional search market where buyers search and match to vertically differentiated sellers. The market is segmented into submarkets based on seller types, with segmentation serving as a public sig…
SegmentationIrrelevance of personalized pricing under strategic market segmentation
A multiproduct seller is more informed than consumers about the value of her products to consumers. The seller posts a price list and segments the market through cheap-talk communication. We find that when both seller's …