Decomposability and Strategy-proofness in Multidimensional Models
We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional hybrid preferences arise naturally through assembling marginal preferences under the condition of semi-separability - a weakening of separability. The main result shows that under a suitable "richness" condition, every strategy-proof rule on this domain can be decomposed into component-wise strategy-proof rules, and more importantly every domain of preferences that reconciles decomposability of rules with strategy-proofness must be a multidimensional hybrid domain.
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