Deep-TROJ: An Inference Stage Trojan Insertion Algorithm through Efficient Weight Replacement Attack
To insert Trojan into a Deep Neural Network (DNN) the existing attack assumes the attacker can access the victim's training facilities. However a realistic threat model was recently developed by leveraging memory fault to inject Trojans at the inference stage. In this work we develop a novel Trojan attack by adopting a unique memory fault injection technique that can inject bit-flip into the page table of the main memory. In the main memory each weight block consists of a group of weights located at a specific address of a DRAM row. A bit-flip in the page frame number replaces a target weight block of a DNN model with another replacement weight block. To develop a successful Trojan attack leveraging this unique fault model the attacker must solve three key challenges: i) how to identify a minimum set of target weight blocks to be modified? ii) how to identify the corresponding optimal replacement weight block? iii) how to optimize the trigger to maximize the attacker's objective given a target and replacement weight block set? We address them by proposing a novel Deep-TROJ attack algorithm that can identify a minimum set of vulnerable target and corresponding replacement weight blocks while optimizing the trigger at the same time. We evaluate the performance of our proposed Deep-TROJ on CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 and ImageNet dataset for sixteen different DNN architectures including vision transformers. Proposed Deep-TROJ is the most successful one to date that does not require access to training facilities while successfully bypassing the existing defenses. Our code is available at https://github.com/ML-Security-Research-LAB/Deep-TROJ.
Code (1)
Methods 이 논문이 사용한 방법론
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
TrojText: Test-time Invisible Textual Trojan Insertion
In Natural Language Processing (NLP), intelligent neuron models can be susceptible to textual Trojan attacks. Such attacks occur when Trojan models behave normally for standard inputs but generate malicious output for in…
SST-2TroLLoc: Logic Locking and Layout Hardening for IC Security Closure against Hardware Trojans
Due to cost benefits, supply chains of integrated circuits (ICs) are largely outsourced nowadays. However, passing ICs through various third-party providers gives rise to many security threats, like piracy of IC intellec…
TrojanGYM: A Detector-in-the-Loop LLM for Adaptive RTL Hardware Trojan Insertion
Hardware Trojans (HTs) remain a critical threat because learning-based detectors often overfit to narrow trigger/payload patterns and small, stylized benchmarks. We introduce TrojanGYM, an agentic, LLM-driven framework t…
Security Closure of IC Layouts Against Hardware Trojans
Due to cost benefits, supply chains of integrated circuits (ICs) are largely outsourced nowadays. However, passing ICs through various third-party providers gives rise to many threats, like piracy of IC intellectual prop…
TrojanForge: Generating Adversarial Hardware Trojan Examples Using Reinforcement Learning
The Hardware Trojan (HT) problem can be thought of as a continuous game between attackers and defenders, each striving to outsmart the other by leveraging any available means for an advantage. Machine Learning (ML) has r…
reinforcement-learningReinforcement LearningReinforcement Learning (RL)