paper-with-me

Papers

Default Supply Auctions in Electricity Markets: Challenges and Proposals

2022-02-03 · Juan Ignacio Peña, Rosa Rodriguez

This paper studies premiums got by winning bidders in default supply auctions, and speculation and hedging activities in power derivatives markets in dates near auctions. Data includes fifty-six auction prices from 2007 to 2013, those of CESUR in the Spanish OMEL electricity market, and those of Basic Generation Service auctions (PJM-BGS) in New Jersey's PJM market. Winning bidders got an average ex-post yearly forward premium of 7% (CESUR) and 38% (PJM-BGS). The premium using an index of futures prices is 1.08% (CESUR) and 24% (PJM-BGS). Ex-post forward premium is negatively related to the number of bidders and spot price volatility. In CESUR, hedging-driven trading in power derivatives markets predominates around auction dates, but in PJM-BGS, speculation-driven trading prevails.

📄 PDF Abstract BibTeX arXiv:2202.01743

Code (0)

등록된 구현이 없습니다.

Methods 이 논문이 사용한 방법론

Golden Queue Managers 설명 없음

Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반

Optimal bidding in hourly and quarter-hourly electricity price auctions: trading large volumes of power with market impact and transaction costs

2021-04-29 · Michał Narajewski, Florian Ziel

This paper addresses the question of how much to bid to maximize the profit when trading in two electricity markets: the hourly Day-Ahead Auction and the quarter-hourly Intraday Auction. For optimal coordinated bidding m…

Approximate Equilibria in Nonconvex Markets: Theory and Evidence from European Electricity Auctions

2025-03-04 · Thomas Hübner

The existence of Walrasian equilibrium is usually not guaranteed when some market participants have nonconvex preferences. This limitation applies to many real-world markets, including day-ahead electricity auctions. Des…

Package Bids in Combinatorial Electricity Auctions: Selection, Welfare Losses, and Alternatives

2025-02-13 · Thomas Hübner, Gabriela Hug

A key challenge in combinatorial auctions is designing bid formats that accurately capture agents' preferences while remaining computationally feasible. This is especially true for electricity auctions, where complex pre…

Improved learning rates in multi-unit uniform price auctions

2025-01-17 · Marius Potfer, Dorian Baudry, Hugo Richard, Vianney Perchet 외

Motivated by the strategic participation of electricity producers in electricity day-ahead market, we study the problem of online learning in repeated multi-unit uniform price auctions focusing on the adversarial opposin…

Change of persistence in European electricity spot prices

2021-12-07 · Leonardo Rydin Gorjão, Dirk Witthaut, Pedro G. Lind, Wided Medjroubi

The European Power Exchange has introduced day-ahead auctions and continuous trading spot markets to facilitate the insertion of renewable electricity. These markets are designed to balance excess or lack of power in sho…

Time SeriesTime Series Analysis