Efficient Refusal Ablation in LLM through Optimal Transport
Safety-aligned language models refuse harmful requests through learned refusal behaviors encoded in their internal representations. Recent activation-based jailbreaking methods circumvent these safety mechanisms by applying orthogonal projections to remove refusal directions, but these approaches treat refusal as a one-dimensional phenomenon and ignore the rich distributional structure of model activations. We introduce a principled framework based on optimal transport theory that transforms the entire distribution of harmful activations to match harmless ones. By combining PCA with closed-form Gaussian optimal transport, we achieve efficient computation in high-dimensional representation spaces while preserving essential geometric structure. Across six models (Llama-2, Llama-3.1, Qwen-2.5; 7B-32B parameters), our method achieves up to 11% higher attack success rates than state-of-the-art baselines while maintaining comparable perplexity, demonstrating superior preservation of model capabilities. Critically, we discover that layer-selective intervention (applying optimal transport to 1-2 carefully chosen layers at approximately 40-60% network depth) substantially outperforms full-network interventions, revealing that refusal mechanisms may be localized rather than distributed. Our analysis provides new insights into the geometric structure of safety representations and suggests that current alignment methods may be vulnerable to distributional attacks beyond simple direction removal.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Refusal geometry reflects refusal training: diverse refusal prefixes can raise stable rank and weaken refusal vector ablation attacks
Refusal training protects AI models from jailbreaks by training models to decline unsafe queries, reducing the risk of misuse. Recent work finds that refusal behavior in aligned language models can be mediated by a singl…
Surgical Refusal Ablation: Disentangling Safety from Intelligence via Concept-Guided Spectral Cleaning
Safety-aligned language models systematically refuse harmful requests. While activation steering can modulate refusal, ablating the raw "refusal vector" calculated from contrastive harmful and harmless prompts often caus…
Surgical, Cheap, and Flexible: Mitigating False Refusal in Language Models via Single Vector Ablation
Training a language model to be both helpful and harmless requires careful calibration of refusal behaviours: Models should refuse to follow malicious instructions or give harmful advice (e.g. "how do I kill someone?"), …
Language ModelingLanguage ModellingLatent-space Attacks for Refusal Evasion in Language Models
Safety-aligned language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet refusal behavior can be suppressed by steering their internal representations. Existing methods do so by ablating a refusal direction from model …
Over-Refusal and Representation Subspaces: A Mechanistic Analysis of Task-Conditioned Refusal in Aligned LLMs
Aligned language models that are trained to refuse harmful requests also exhibit over-refusal: they decline safe instructions that seemingly resemble harmful instructions. A natural approach is to ablate the global refus…