Estimation of Energy Prices in Turkey in the Nash-Cournot Framework
Increase of mass production with the industrial revolution has increased the country's dependence on energy. Even today, energy constitutes the main weight of industrialization. Especially for countries dependent on energy from abroad, energy prices are very important, and fluctuations in energy prices are decisive for the economies of these countries. Fluctuations in energy prices make the future course of energy prices important for both energy demanding countries and energy-supplying countries. There are many methods in the related literature. Our estimate of energy prices for Turkey will be based on the Nash-Cournot framework. In the Nash-Cournot framework, energy is considered as a homogeneous commodity and market equilibrium is determined by the capacity-setting decisions of the suppliers. The model indicates that competitors aim to produce more by reacting to higher prices. A fundamental offer-based stochastic model is being put forward in order to predict the energy prices and the mean price in a given period. Two ambiguous sources are addressed, these are energy producers and demand. Studies have shown that the expected number of prices increases significantly with the decrease in the number of firms in the market. Within this framework, factors determining the energy prices in Turkey will be determined and forecasts for the future will be made.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Empirical Framework for Cournot Oligopoly with Private Information
We propose an empirical framework for asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with private information about variable costs. First, considering a linear demand for a homogenous product with a random intercept, we characterize the B…
Nash equilibria of the pay-as-bid auction with K-Lipschitz supply functions
We model a system of n asymmetric firms selling a homogeneous good in a common market through a pay-as-bid auction. Every producer chooses as its strategy a supply function returning the quantity S(p) that it is willing …
Nash Equilibrium of Joint Day-ahead Electricity Markets and Forward Contracts in Congested Power Systems
Uncertainty in the output power of large-scale wind power plants (WPPs) can face the electricity market players with undesirable profit variations. Market players can hedge themselves against these risks by participating…
A fractional-order difference Cournot duopoly game with long memory
We reconsider the Cournot duopoly problem in light of the theory for long memory. We introduce the Caputo fractional-order difference calculus to classical duopoly theory to propose a fractional-order discrete Cournot du…
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning in Cournot Games
In this work, we study the interaction of strategic agents in continuous action Cournot games with limited information feedback. Cournot game is the essential market model for many socio-economic systems where agents lea…
continuous-controlContinuous ControlMulti-agent Reinforcement Learningreinforcement-learning+2