Evolutionary game on networks with high clustering coefficient
This study investigates the influence of lattice structure in evolutionary games. The snowdrift games is considered in networks with high clustering coefficients, that use four different strategy-updating. Analytical conjectures using pair approximation were compared with the numerical results. Results indicate that general statements asserting that the lattice structure enhances cooperation are misleading.
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ClusteringVocal Bursts Intensity PredictionSimilar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
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