Evolutionary games: natural selection of strategies
In this paper, I model and study the process of natural selection between all possible mixed strategies in classical two-player two-strategy games. I derive and solve an equation that is a natural generalization of the Taylor-Jonker replicator equation that describes dynamics of pure strategy frequencies. I then investigate the evolution of not only frequencies of pure strategies but also of total distribution of mixed strategies. I show that the process of natural selection of strategies for all games obeys the dynamical Principle of minimum of information gain.
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