I Don't Know You, But I Can Catch You: Real-Time Defense against Diverse Adversarial Patches for Object Detectors
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have revolutionized the field of computer vision like object detection with their unparalleled performance. However, existing research has shown that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In the physical world, an adversary could exploit adversarial patches to implement a Hiding Attack (HA) which patches the target object to make it disappear from the detector, and an Appearing Attack (AA) which fools the detector into misclassifying the patch as a specific object. Recently, many defense methods for detectors have been proposed to mitigate the potential threats of adversarial patches. However, such methods still have limitations in generalization, robustness and efficiency. Most defenses are only effective against the HA, leaving the detector vulnerable to the AA. In this paper, we propose \textit{NutNet}, an innovative model for detecting adversarial patches, with high generalization, robustness and efficiency. With experiments for six detectors including YOLOv2-v4, SSD, Faster RCNN and DETR on both digital and physical domains, the results show that our proposed method can effectively defend against both the HA and AA, with only 0.4\% sacrifice of the clean performance. We compare NutNet with four baseline defense methods for detectors, and our method exhibits an average defense performance that is over 2.4 times and 4.7 times higher than existing approaches for HA and AA, respectively. In addition, NutNet only increases the inference time by 8\%, which can meet the real-time requirements of the detection systems. Demos of NutNet are available at: \url{https://sites.google.com/view/nutnet}.
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