Investigating the Jamming Attack on 5G NR Physical Channels
This study investigates the jamming attack on the orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) based physical channels in 5G new radio (NR) technology from the aspect of signal processing. Disrupting the orthogonality property between subcarriers (SCs) is considered as one of the jammers targets in OFDM based generations. Focusing on the orthogonality property, we propose a method to detect the attacked subcarriers, and then neutralize the jamming attack using a multiplicative signal. Thanks to studying the frequency aspect of the attacked signal, the proposed method is independent of the jammers transmitted power. Simulation results evaluate the detection performance of the proposed method with various numbers of OFDM subcarriers.
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