Invisible Threats from Model Context Protocol: Generating Stealthy Injection Payload via Tree-based Adaptive Search
Recent advances in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) have enabled large language models (LLMs) to invoke external tools with unprecedented ease. This creates a new class of powerful and tool augmented agents. Unfortunately, this capability also introduces an under explored attack surface, specifically the malicious manipulation of tool responses. Existing techniques for indirect prompt injection that target MCP suffer from high deployment costs, weak semantic coherence, or heavy white box requirements. Furthermore, they are often easily detected by recently proposed defenses. In this paper, we propose Tree structured Injection for Payloads (TIP), a novel black-box attack which generates natural payloads to reliably seize control of MCP enabled agents even under defense. Technically, We cast payload generation as a tree structured search problem and guide the search with an attacker LLM operating under our proposed coarse-to-fine optimization framework. To stabilize learning and avoid local optima, we introduce a path-aware feedback mechanism that surfaces only high quality historical trajectories to the attacker model. The framework is further hardened against defensive transformations by explicitly conditioning the search on observable defense signals and dynamically reallocating the exploration budget. Extensive experiments on four mainstream LLMs show that TIP attains over 95% attack success in undefended settings while requiring an order of magnitude fewer queries than prior adaptive attacks. Against four representative defense approaches, TIP preserves more than 50% effectiveness and significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art attacks. By implementing the attack on real world MCP systems, our results expose an invisible but practical threat vector in MCP deployments. We also discuss potential mitigation approaches to address this critical security gap.
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