Justified Fairness in House Allocation Problems: two Characterizations of Strategy-proof Mechanisms
We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where monetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of justified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties (strategy-proofness and non-bossiness), our two new properties identify serial dictatorships and sequential dictatorships, respectively.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Tasks
FairnessSimilar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Fairness in Repeated Matching: A Maximin Perspective
We study a sequential decision-making model where a set of items is repeatedly matched to the same set of agents over multiple rounds. The objective is to determine a sequence of matchings that either maximizes the utili…
Balanced House Allocation
We introduce balancedness a fairness axiom in house allocation problems. It requires a mechanism to assign the top choice, the second top choice, and so on, on the same number of profiles for each agent. This axiom guara…
FairnessIncentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms
We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy…
Fractional Top Trading Cycle on the Full Preference Domain
Efficiency and fairness are two desiderata in market design. Fairness requires randomization in many environments. Observing the inadequacy of Top Trading Cycle (TTC) to incorporate randomization, Yu and Zhang (2020) pro…
FairnessGraphical House Allocation
The classical house allocation problem involves assigning $n$ houses (or items) to $n$ agents according to their preferences. A key criterion in such problems is satisfying some fairness constraints such as envy-freeness…
Fairness