Keeping up with "The Joneses": reference dependent choice with social comparisons
Keeping up with "The Joneses" matters. This paper examines a model of reference dependent choice where reference points are determined by social comparisons. An increase in the strength of social comparisons, even by only a few agents, increases consumption and decreases welfare for everyone. Strikingly, a higher marginal cost of consumption can increase welfare. In a labour market, social comparisons with co-workers create a big fish in a small pond effect, inducing incomplete labour market sorting. Further, it is the skilled workers with the weakest social networks who are induced to give up income to become the big fish.
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