Large Population Games on Constrained Unreliable Networks
This paper studies an $N$--agent cost-coupled game where the agents are connected via an unreliable capacity constrained network. Each agent receives state information over that network which loses packets with probability $p$. A Base station (BS) actively schedules agent communications over the network by minimizing a weighted Age of Information (WAoI) based cost function under a capacity limit $\mathcal{C} < N$ on the number of transmission attempts at each instant. Under a standard information structure, we show that the problem can be decoupled into a scheduling problem for the BS and a game problem for the $N$ agents. Since the scheduling problem is an NP hard combinatorics problem, we propose an approximately optimal solution which approaches the optimal solution as $N \rightarrow \infty$. In the process, we also provide some insights on the case without channel erasure. Next, to solve the large population game problem, we use the mean-field game framework to compute an approximate decentralized Nash equilibrium. Finally, we validate the theoretical results using a numerical example.
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