LatentGuard: Controllable Latent Steering for Robust Refusal of Attacks and Reliable Response Generation
Achieving robust safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) while preserving their utility remains a fundamental challenge. Existing approaches often struggle to balance comprehensive safety with fine-grained controllability at the representation level. We introduce LATENTGUARD, a novel three-stage framework that combines behavioral alignment with supervised latent space control for interpretable and precise safety steering. Our approach begins by fine-tuning an LLM on rationalized datasets containing both reasoning-enhanced refusal responses to adversarial prompts and reasoning-enhanced normal responses to benign queries, establishing robust behavioral priors across both safety-critical and utility-preserving scenarios. We then train a structured variational autoencoder (VAE) on intermediate MLP activations, supervised by multi-label annotations including attack types, attack methods, and benign indicators. This supervision enables the VAE to learn disentangled latent representations that capture distinct adversarial characteristics while maintaining semantic interpretability. Through targeted manipulation of learned latent dimensions, LATENTGUARD achieves selective refusal behavior, effectively blocking harmful requests while preserving helpfulness for legitimate use cases. Experiments on Qwen3-8B demonstrate significant improvements in both safety controllability and response interpretability without compromising utility. Cross-architecture validation on Mistral-7B confirms the generalizability of our latent steering approach, showing consistent effectiveness across different model families. Our results suggest that structured representation-level intervention offers a promising pathway toward building safer yet practical LLM systems.
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