Learning to be Indifferent in Complex Decisions: A Coarse Payoff-Assessment Model
We introduce the Coarse Payoff-Assessment Learning (CPAL) model, which captures reinforcement learning by boundedly rational decision-makers who focus on the aggregate outcomes of choosing among exogenously defined clusters of alternatives (similarity classes), rather than evaluating each alternative individually. Analyzing a smooth approximation of the model, we show that the learning dynamics exhibit steady-states corresponding to smooth Valuation Equilibria (Jehiel and Samet, 2007). We demonstrate the existence of multiple equilibria in decision trees with generic payoffs and establish the local asymptotic stability of pure equilibria when they occur. Conversely, when trivial choices featuring alternatives within the same similarity class yield sufficiently high payoffs, a unique mixed equilibrium emerges, characterized by indifferences between similarity classes, even under acute sensitivity to payoff differences. Finally, we prove that this unique mixed equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable under the CPAL dynamics.
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