Learning to Manipulate a Commitment Optimizer
It is shown in recent studies that in a Stackelberg game the follower can manipulate the leader by deviating from their true best-response behavior. Such manipulations are computationally tractable and can be highly beneficial for the follower. Meanwhile, they may result in significant payoff losses for the leader, sometimes completely defeating their first-mover advantage. A warning to commitment optimizers, the risk these findings indicate appears to be alleviated to some extent by a strict information advantage the manipulations rely on. That is, the follower knows the full information about both players' payoffs whereas the leader only knows their own payoffs. In this paper, we study the manipulation problem with this information advantage relaxed. We consider the scenario where the follower is not given any information about the leader's payoffs to begin with but has to learn to manipulate by interacting with the leader. The follower can gather necessary information by querying the leader's optimal commitments against contrived best-response behaviors. Our results indicate that the information advantage is not entirely indispensable to the follower's manipulations: the follower can learn the optimal way to manipulate in polynomial time with polynomially many queries of the leader's optimal commitment.
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