Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed player partially shares his private information with the receiver and the latter then, based on her belief about the state, takes an action. This action, together with the state of nature, determines the utility of both players. This paper analyzes a dynamic Bayesian persuasion model where the state of nature evolves according to a Markovian law. Here, the sender always knows the realized state, while the receiver randomly gets to know it. We discuss the value of the sender when he becomes more and more patient and its relation to the revelation rate, namely the probability at which the true state is revealed to the receiver at any stage.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Markovian Persuasion
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does…
Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade from Scratch
In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has been devoted to settings in which send…
PersuasivenessMarkovian Persuasion with Two States
This paper addresses the question of how to best communicate information over time in order to influence an agent's belief and induced actions in a model with a binary state of the world that evolves according to a Marko…
Vocal Bursts Valence PredictionFrom elephant to goldfish (and back): memory in stochastic Volterra processes
We propose a new theoretical framework that exploits convolution kernels to transform a Volterra path-dependent (non-Markovian) stochastic process into a standard (Markovian) diffusion process. This transformation is ach…
Markovian Embeddings for Coalitional Bargaining Games
We examine the Markovian properties of coalition bargaining games, in particular, the case where past rejected proposals cannot be repeated. We propose a Markovian embedding with filtrations to render the sates Markovian…