MaskForge: Structure-Aware Adaptive Attacks for Jailbreaking Diffusion Large Language Models
Diffusion large language models (dLLMs) generate text by iteratively denoising partially masked sequences under bidirectional context, exposing a safety surface distinct from autoregressive LLMs. Because mask tokens are native inputs and tokens are committed by confidence rather than position, harmful content can be induced through infilling and outside the monitored prefix. Existing jailbreaks either miss this native infill capability or rely on low-diversity mask-bearing templates applied uniformly across goals, with little structural adaptation or accumulated attack experience. We propose MaskForge, a fully black-box adaptive attack that casts dLLM red-teaming as optimized search over a growing library of structural patterns. MaskForge abstracts successful attempts into reusable schemas, selects goal-compatible patterns with a UCB bandit, and invokes a scorer-guided fallback when the current library fails. Successful attempts are distilled back into the pattern library, enabling experience to accumulate across goals. Across five public dLLMs and three benchmarks, MaskForge achieves an average attack success rate of 79.3%, a 17.6% relative improvement over the strongest competing dLLM baseline. The matured pattern library further transfers to AdvBench without any updates, achieving a 88.2% attack success rate and a 67% relative improvement over the strongest competing baseline.
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