Maximal Procurement under a Budget
We study the problem of a principal who wants to influence an agent's observable action, subject to an ex-post budget. The agent has a private type determining their cost function. This paper endogenizes the value of the resource driving incentives, which holds no inherent value but is restricted by finite availability. We characterize the optimal mechanism, showing the emergence of a pooling region where the budget constraint binds for low-cost types. We then introduce a linear value for the transferable resource; as the principal's value increases, the mechanism demands more from agents with binding budget constraint but less from others.
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