Mediated Persuasion
We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after observing the signal generated by the first two players. We characterize sufficient conditions for information revelation, compare outcomes with and without a mediator and provide comparative statics with regard to the preferences of the sender and the mediator. We also provide novel conceptual and computational insights about the set of feasible posterior beliefs that the sender can induce, and use these results to obtain insights about equilibrium outcomes. The sender never benefits from mediation, while the receiver might. Strikingly, the receiver benefits when the mediator's preferences are not perfectly aligned with hers; rather the mediator should prefer more information revelation than the sender, but less than perfect revelation.
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