Membership Inference Attacks on DNNs using Adversarial Perturbations
Several membership inference (MI) attacks have been proposed to audit a target DNN. Given a set of subjects, MI attacks tell which subjects the target DNN has seen during training. This work focuses on the post-training MI attacks emphasizing high confidence membership detection -- True Positive Rates (TPR) at low False Positive Rates (FPR). Current works in this category -- likelihood ratio attack (LiRA) and enhanced MI attack (EMIA) -- only perform well on complex datasets (e.g., CIFAR-10 and Imagenet) where the target DNN overfits its train set, but perform poorly on simpler datasets (0% TPR by both attacks on Fashion-MNIST, 2% and 0% TPR respectively by LiRA and EMIA on MNIST at 1% FPR). To address this, firstly, we unify current MI attacks by presenting a framework divided into three stages -- preparation, indication and decision. Secondly, we utilize the framework to propose two novel attacks: (1) Adversarial Membership Inference Attack (AMIA) efficiently utilizes the membership and the non-membership information of the subjects while adversarially minimizing a novel loss function, achieving 6% TPR on both Fashion-MNIST and MNIST datasets; and (2) Enhanced AMIA (E-AMIA) combines EMIA and AMIA to achieve 8% and 4% TPRs on Fashion-MNIST and MNIST datasets respectively, at 1% FPR. Thirdly, we introduce two novel augmented indicators that positively leverage the loss information in the Gaussian neighborhood of a subject. This improves TPR of all four attacks on average by 2.5% and 0.25% respectively on Fashion-MNIST and MNIST datasets at 1% FPR. Finally, we propose simple, yet novel, evaluation metric, the running TPR average (RTA) at a given FPR, that better distinguishes different MI attacks in the low FPR region. We also show that AMIA and E-AMIA are more transferable to the unknown DNNs (other than the target DNN) and are more robust to DP-SGD training as compared to LiRA and EMIA.
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Inference AttackMembership Inference AttackSimilar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
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