Mitigating Evasion Attacks in Federated Learning-Based Signal Classifiers
Recent interest in leveraging federated learning (FL) for radio signal classification (SC) tasks has shown promise but FL-based SC remains susceptible to model poisoning adversarial attacks. These adversarial attacks mislead the ML model training process, damaging ML models across the network and leading to lower SC performance. In this work, we seek to mitigate model poisoning adversarial attacks on FL-based SC by proposing the Underlying Server Defense of Federated Learning (USD-FL). Unlike existing server-driven defenses, USD-FL does not rely on perfect network information, i.e., knowing the quantity of adversaries, the adversarial attack architecture, or the start time of the adversarial attacks. Our proposed USD-FL methodology consists of deriving logits for devices' ML models on a reserve dataset, comparing pair-wise logits via 1-Wasserstein distance and then determining a time-varying threshold for adversarial detection. As a result, USD-FL effectively mitigates model poisoning attacks introduced in the FL network. Specifically, when baseline server-driven defenses do have perfect network information, USD-FL outperforms them by (i) improving final ML classification accuracies by at least 6%, (ii) reducing false positive adversary detection rates by at least 10%, and (iii) decreasing the total number of misclassified signals by over 8%. Moreover, when baseline defenses do not have perfect network information, we show that USD-FL achieves accuracies of approximately 74.1% and 62.5% in i.i.d. and non-i.i.d. settings, outperforming existing server-driven baselines, which achieve 52.1% and 39.2% in i.i.d. and non-i.i.d. settings, respectively.
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Adversarial AttackFederated LearningModel PoisoningSimilar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
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