Nash equilibria of games with generalized complementarities
To generalize complementarities for games, we introduce some conditions weaker than quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property. We prove that the Nash equilibria of a game satisfying these conditions form a nonempty complete lattice. This is a purely order-theoretic generalization of Zhou's theorem.
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