Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market
In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash equilibrium when both sides of the market play strategically. Moreover, when only workers play strategically and firms' choice functions satisfy the law of aggregate demand, we show that the firm-optimal stable rule implements the stable correspondence in Nash equilibrium.
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