Non-computability of human intelligence
We revisit the question (most famously) initiated by Turing: can human intelligence be completely modeled by a Turing machine? We show that the answer is \emph{no}, assuming a certain weak soundness hypothesis. More specifically we show that at least some meaningful thought processes of the brain cannot be Turing computable. In particular some physical processes are not Turing computable, which is not entirely expected. There are some similarities of our argument with the well known Lucas-Penrose argument, but we work purely on the level of Turing machines, and do not use G\"odel's incompleteness theorem or any direct analogue. Instead we construct directly and use a weak analogue of a G\"odel statement for a certain system which involves our human, this allows us to side-step some (possible) meta-logical issues with their argument.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Is Complexity Important for Philosophy of Mind?
Computational complexity has often been ignored in philosophy of mind, in philosophical artificial intelligence studies. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First and foremost, to show the importance of complexity ra…
PhilosophySuperintelligence cannot be contained: Lessons from Computability Theory
Superintelligence is a hypothetical agent that possesses intelligence far surpassing that of the brightest and most gifted human minds. In light of recent advances in machine intelligence, a number of scientists, philoso…
On the Computability of AIXI
How could we solve the machine learning and the artificial intelligence problem if we had infinite computation? Solomonoff induction and the reinforcement learning agent AIXI are proposed answers to this question. Both a…
BIG-bench Machine Learningreinforcement-learningReinforcement LearningReinforcement Learning (RL)How To Solve Moral Conundrums with Computability Theory
Various moral conundrums plague population ethics: the Non-Identity Problem, the Procreation Asymmetry, the Repugnant Conclusion, and more. I argue that the aforementioned moral conundrums have a structure neatly account…
EthicsPhilosophyIncompleteness for stably consistent formal systems
We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable consistency intended to reflect the actual consistency property of human beings. Then we give a generalization of the first and second G\"odel incompleteness theore…
LEMMASentence