Normative Multiagent Systems: A Dynamic Generalization
Social norms are powerful formalism in coordinating autonomous agents' behaviour to achieve certain objectives. In this paper, we propose a dynamic normative system to enable the reasoning of the changes of norms under different circumstances, which cannot be done in the existing static normative systems. We study two important problems (norm synthesis and norm recognition) related to the autonomy of the entire system and the agents, and characterise the computational complexities of solving these problems.
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