Note on solving one-to-one matching models with linear transferable utility
We derive a system of fixed-point equations for the equilibrium transfers in a class of one-to-one matching models with linear transferable utility. We then show that, when the degree of substitution between alternatives is bounded from above, the derived system of equations constitutes a contraction mapping. As a result, fixed-point iterations are guaranteed to converge to the unique distribution of equilibrium transfers.
Code (1)
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game
Matching problems with linearly transferable utility (LTU) generalize the well-studied transferable utility (TU) case by relaxing the assumption that utility is transferred one-for-one within matched pairs. We show that …
Structural Estimation of Matching Markets with Transferable Utility
This paper provides an introduction to structural estimation methods for matching markets with transferable utility.
Individual Rationality Conditions of Identifying Matching Costs in Transferable Utility Matching Games
As the widely applied method for measuring matching assortativeness in a transferable utility matching game, a matching maximum score estimation is proposed by \cite{fox2010qe}. This article reveals that combining unmatc…
Estimating Separable Matching Models
In this paper we propose two simple methods to estimate models of matching with transferable and separable utility introduced in Galichon and Salani\'e (2022). The first method is a minimum distance estimator that relies…
Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility
In this paper, we examine matching models with imperfectly transferable utility (ITU). We provide motivating examples, discuss the theoretical foundations of ITU matching models and present methods for estimating them. W…