On the integration of Shapley-Scarf housing markets
We study the welfare consequences of merging Shapley--Scarf markets. Market integration can lead to large welfare losses and make the vast majority of agents worse-off, but is on average welfare-enhancing and makes all agents better off ex-ante. The number of agents harmed by integration is a minority when all markets are small or agents' preferences are highly correlated.
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